"Download for Free" - When Do Providers of Digital Goods Offer Free Samples? by Boom, Anette
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.gesy.uni-mannheim.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D. · Department of Economics · University of Mannheim · D-68131 Mannheim, 
Phone: +49(0621)1812786 · Fax: +49(0621)1812785 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2004 
 
 
*Anette Boom, Freie Universität Berlin 
 
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
 
Discussion Paper No. 70 
"Download for Free" - When Do 
Providers of Digital Goods Offer 
Free Samples? 
Anette Boom* 
”Download for Free” - When Do Providers of
Digital Goods Offer Free Samples?
Anette Boom∗
Freie Universita¨t Berlin
September 2004
Abstract
In a monopoly setting where consumers cannot observe the quality
of the product we show that free samples which are of a lower quality
than the marketed digital goods are used together with high prices
as signals for a superior quality if the number of informed consumers
is small and if the difference between the high and the low quality
is not too small. Social welfare is higher, if the monopolist uses also
free samples as signals, compared to a situation where he is restricted
to pure price signalling. Both, the monopolist and consumers benefit
from the additional signal.
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1 Introduction
In the internet economy we often observe providers which offer free sam-
ples of their products. North-Holland, for example, allows non-subscribers of
their scientific journals to download certain complimentary articles. Software
providers like Qualcomm offer so-called light or sponsored versions of their
software for free, which are either not as capable as the full version or con-
taminated with advertisements that open up, while these versions are used.
Also publishing houses and record labels place parts of their newly released
novels or records in the internet for free downloads.1
Certainly, potential buyers of a novel would not pay less for the book, if
they received five pages of the novel for free from the internet. In case of
software programs that deliver at least the basic features of the full version,
as Qualcomm’s Eudora Light, one would, however, expect a reduction in the
willingness to pay for the full version because of the free availability of the
light version. Software and most other digital goods are durable. Therefore
consumers would only pay for the extra benefit which the full version delivers
and not for the full benefit. Why do providers of digital goods then offer free
samples?
Shapiro and Varian (1998) suggest several reasons. Consumers might receive
one product out of a bundle for free in order to increase their willingness
to pay for some complementary components. Firms might want to create
a critical mass in order to ensure high enough network externalities. They
might want to catch the attention of the consumers for some advertisements,
or they might want to achieve some competitive advantage by the preemption
of other competitors. Shapiro and Varian (1998) also mention that firms
might want to convince potential customers of the quality of their products.
The latter motivation is the focus of this paper. Firms which want to convince
potential consumers of the quality of their digital product face the same kind
of problem as has already been identified by Arrow (1962) with respect to
information as a commodity. The value of a certain software, for example,
is not known until a consumer has it, but if he has it, it can no longer be
sold to him, and the software can be reproduced and distributed at little or
no cost. Thus, the questions which are addressed in this paper are: how
comprehensive must a free sample of a digital good be in order to serve as a
signal for a high quality, would a monopolist use free samples if he could also
set a high price in order to signal a high quality, how are profits, consumer’s
1See e.g. the internet pages of the Deutsche Grammophon and the Aufbau-Verlag, a
German publishing house.
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surplus and social welfare affected by the use of free samples as a signalling
device, and, finally, should free samples be restricted?
Free samples have been a major issue in the marketing literature. There are
lots of empirical studies which try to evaluate the effect of free samples on
consumers’ behavior.2 With the exception of Smith and Swinyard (1983),
who chose an experimental approach, all these studies rely on survey data,
and all consider non-durable products (mostly food and detergents) which
cannot easily be reproduced.
This is also true for most of the much scarcer economic literature on free sam-
ples. Moraga-Gonzalez (2000) analyzes a monopolistic market with asym-
metric information concerning the quality of a good. The monopolist can
endogenously influence the number of informed consumers by the number
of distributed free samples. Moraga-Gonzalez (2000) does not assume that
the free samples reduce demand, and does definitely not allow for a good
which is easily reproduced, because otherwise it would be impossible for the
monopolist to perfectly control the number of informed consumers. Lecocq
et al. (1999) also consider a non-durable and a non-reproducable product.
They report the results of an experiment, they pursued during a conference
of the Vineyard Data Quantification Society, where the subjects bid in a wine
auction with and without tasting the wine, before they placed their bids.
Only Foster and Horowitz (1996) and Kamp (1998), who comments on the
former, consider free samples of a durable good. They investigate, whether
the resale of complimentary textbooks by professors increase the price that
the students have to pay for new textbooks. The textbook market, where
students pay and professors decide, is, however, very special and not easily
comparable to the markets for digital goods.
Contrary to Moraga-Gonzalez (2000)and to Foster and Horowitz (1996) and
Kamp (1998), I assume here that every consumer receives the free sample, in
order to map the easy access to free digital samples in reality. Similar to a
recent contribution by Anton and Yao (2002) on the sale of new ideas, I also
assume that the value of the digital product is additive. Thus, consumers
only want to pay for the quality they expect to receive in addition to the free
sample, if there is one. Contrary to Anton and Yao (2002), I assume that
the utility levels of the consumers are, however, not verifiable. Therefore the
providers of digital products cannot condition the payments of their clients
on their realized levels of satisfaction.
In the next section the main assumptions of the model are introduced. It
2See e.g. Scott (1976), Smith and Swinyard (1983), Marks and Kamins (1988), McGuin-
ness et al. (1995), Gedenk and Neslin (1999) and Moore and Lutz (2000).
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is an adverse selection version of the well known model of vertical product
differentiation, first used by Mussa and Rosen (1978), that is extended to
asymmetric quality information and free samples. Then I show that free
samples can serve as a signal for good quality in a monopoly framework.
The mechanism is pretty similar to Cooper and Ross (1984) and Bagwell
and Riordan (1991). Since some consumers can observe the true quality of
the product, a high quality provider can find a level of quality for his free
sample and a price level, that cannot be imitated by the low quality provider
and that allows him to sell his premium quality still for a high enough price
in order to be more profitable than without differentiating from a low quality
provider. Focussing on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium that fulfills the
intuitive criterion from Cho and Kreps (1987), I show that signalling via
free samples takes place only together with price signalling. Free samples
are provided if the number of informed consumers is rather small and if the
low quality is in an intermediate range compared to the high quality. Social
welfare is always enhanced by using free samples as a signal for high quality.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of risk neutral consumers whose mass is normalized
to one. With probability of λ each consumer is an expert who can instan-
taneously recognize the quality of an offered product.3 With probability of
1− λ the consumer is uninformed, cannot observe the quality of a product,
but knows the distribution of qualities in the market. Consumers differ in
the parameter θ which indicates the strength of their preference for quality.
The parameter θ is independently and uniformly distributed on the interval
[0, 1]. Each consumer’s willingness to pay for the known quality q is given
by θq, if there is no free sample. If a free sample with quality s is available,
then the consumer’s willingness to pay for the known quality q is reduced to
θ(q − s).
There is only one firm in the market, which offers a durable digital good. The
firm’s probability to produce a product with the high quality qh is γ ∈ (0, 1).
3Experts are needed in order to have a punishment for low quality providers which
imitate the strategy of high quality providers. The alternative assumptions of repeat
purchases, used e.g. by Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984), Milgrom and Roberts (1986),
and Orzach et al. (2002), or of different constant marginal costs for high and low quality
providers as in Zhao (2000) and Bagwell and Overgaard (2005) do not make sense with
durable digital goods.
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With probability 1 − γ it produces a low quality ql < qh.4 The firm knows
the true quality of its product, but it cannot distinguish between informed
and uninformed consumers. The firm maximizes its profits. It can decide on
providing free samples of its product to all consumers and can determine the
quality s of this free sample. The quality of the firm’s free sample cannot
exceed its product’s quality q ≥ s ≥ 0 with q ∈ {ql, qh}. If the monopolist
chooses s = 0, this means that he does not provide a free sample. The
firm also sets its price and may use it as well in order to signal its digital
good’s quality.5 Note that contrary to conspicuous advertising that has been
combined with price signalling in a model by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) the
free samples have a potential social value if some of the consumers consume
only them and do not buy the monopolist’s product.
Neither the distribution of a free sample nor the distribution of the digital
final good causes any costs. This assumption maps the low distribution and
reproduction costs of digital goods via the internet. In case of digital goods
the main costs of production are the costs of the first copy, in case of software,
the development costs, which are not further considered here.
In the following we investigate, whether perfect Bayesian equilibria exist in
which the provider of a high and of a low quality separate by their pricing
decision and/or by the provision of free samples.
3 The Market Outcome with Perfect Infor-
mation
Suppose that λ = 1 holds, meaning that all consumers are experts and can
recognize the quality of the offered product. If the monopolist of type i = h, l
provides free samples with the quality 0 ≤ si ≤ qi then all consumers buy
whose willingness to pay θ(qi − si) exceeds pi which is equal to:
θ ≥ pi
qi − si ≡ θ(pi, qi, si). (1)
4We concentrate throughout the paper on adverse selection and do not consider moral
hazard issues.
5See, e.g., Cooper and Ross (1984) and Bagwell and Riordan (1991) for models, in
which high quality is signaled via a high price.
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Thus, the monopolist’s profit coincides with:
pi(pi, qi, si) = pimax {[1− θ(pi, qi, si)] , 0}
=


pi
(
1− pi
qi−si
)
if 0 ≤ pi ≤ qi − si,
0 if pi > qi − si.
(2)
The monopolist sets pi and si in order to maximize this profit function. The
firm does not have to take into account any change of the consumers’ beliefs
as a response to its chosen (pi, si) because all the consumers are perfectly
informed by assumption. Therefore it is easy to derive the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1 If all the consumers are informed (λ = 1) then the monop-
olist does not provide any free sample (si = 0), no matter whether he is of
type h or l. The firm of type i = h, l sets pi = qi/2 and realizes a profit of
pi(qi/2, qi, 0) = qi/4.
Proof: Since ∂pi(pi, qi, si)/∂si ≤ 0 holds for all pi, si = 0 follows immediately.
The profit maximizing price pi = qi/2 results from maximizing pi(pi, qi, 0)
with respect to pi. Substituting pi = qi/2 in pi(pi, qi, 0) yields pi(qi/2, qi, 0) =
qi/4.
If all consumers are perfectly informed then providing a free sample with
si > 0 results only in a smaller demand for any given price, because then the
monopolist has to compete with its digital product of quality qi against the
free sample with the quality si. Of course, the monopolist wants to avoid
such a situation and does not provide a free sample.
4 Free Samples with Uninformed Consumers
4.1 Characterization of the Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
ria
Now we assume that there are some uninformed consumers meaning 0 <
λ < 1. These uninformed consumers can observe the price and the quality
of the free sample if there is one. Suppose that these consumers believe that
(p, s) = (ph, sh) signals a high quality and (p, s) 6= (ph, sh) signals a low
quality, then these beliefs must come true in a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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Given these beliefs a monopolist with the quality ql should either choose
(ph, sh) or the combination (pl, sl) = (ql/2, 0) which maximizes pi(pl, ql, sl)
defined in equation (2). The latter is true because the λ informed consumers
observe his low quality anyway, and the 1− λ uninformed consumers expect
that he is a low type as soon as he chooses (p, s) 6= (ph, sh). Since the beliefs
of the uninformed consumers must come true in equilibrium, a producer with
ql must prefer (pl, sl) = (ql/2, 0) to (ph, sh), the price and free sample that
would be interpreted by the uninformed consumer as a signal for a high
quality. Therefore (ph, sh) must satisfy
λpi(ph, ql, sh) + (1− λ)pi(ph, qh, sh) ≤ pi(ql/2, ql, 0) (3)
where pi(·) is defined in equation (2). This coincides with either:
ph >
ql
√
(qh − sh)(ql − sh)
2
[√
(qh − sh)(ql − sh)−
√
(1− λ)(qh − ql)ql − sh(qh − sh)
] (4)
≡ f¯(qh, ql, sh, λ),
or:
ph <
ql
√
(qh − sh)(ql − sh)
2
[√
(qh − sh)(ql − sh) +
√
(1− λ)(qh − ql)ql − sh(qh − sh)
] (5)
≡ f(qh, ql, sh, λ).
Note that f¯(·) ≥ f(·) for all 0 ≤ sh ≤ 1/2[qh −
√
q2h − 4(1− λ)ql(qh − ql)] <
ql. For 1/2[qh−
√
q2h − 4(1− λ)ql(qh − ql)] < sh ≤ ql condition (3) is satisfied
independent of the price level. Any sh > ql cannot be imitated by a low
quality provider and would therefore clearly identify a high type.
The high quality provider should also have no incentive to deviate from
(ph, sh). If he deviates to any (p, s) 6= (ph, sh) the informed consumers still
identify him, whereas the uninformed expect him to be a low quality provider.
Thus, his profit would be
λpi(p, qh, s) + (1− λ)pi(p, ql, s) = p
(
1− λp
qh − s −
(1− λ)p
ql − s
)
.
This profit is decreasing in s, no matter which price p the deviating high
quality provider would choose. Thus, his best deviation from (ph, sh) would
always imply that he does not provide any free samples any more. He would
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always set s = 0. Given s = 0, the high quality provider’s profit, when he
deviates from (ph, sh), is maximized if he chooses
p˜ =
qhql
2[(1− λ)qh + λql] . (6)
Thus, his best deviation from (ph, sh) is (p˜, 0). In a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium even the best deviation (p˜, 0) should be less profitable than sticking to
(ph, sh). Therefore
λpi(p˜, qh, 0) + (1− λ)pi(p˜, ql, 0) ≤ pi(ph, qh, sh) (7)
must hold. Condition (7) coincides with
g(qh, ql, sh, λ) ≤ ph ≤ g¯(qh, ql, sh, λ) with (8)
g(·) ≡ 1
2
(
qh − sh
−
√
[(1− λ)qh + λql] {[(1− λ)qh + λql](qh − sh)− qhql} (qh − sh)
(1− λ)qh + λql
)
and
g¯(·) ≡ 1
2
(
qh − sh
+
√
[(1− λ)qh + λql] {[(1− λ)qh + λql](qh − sh)− qhql} (qh − sh)
(1− λ)qh + λql
)
.
After analyzing the conditions in equation (4), (5) and (8) one can derive
proposition 2 where the critical level
λˆ(ql, qh) ≡ qh(qh − 2ql)
(qh − ql)2
of the number of informed consumers is introduced.
Proposition 2 There are infinitely many separating perfect Bayesian equi-
libria where the uninformed consumers believe that a firm which chooses
(ph, sh) is a high quality firm and a firm which chooses (p, s) 6= (ph, sh) is a
low quality firm and where the high quality provider indeed chooses (ph, sh)
and the low quality provider (pl, sl) = (ql/2, 0). The beliefs (ph, sh) must
satisfy (4), (5) and (8). If the number of informed consumers is low, mean-
ing that 0 < λ ≤ λˆ(qh, ql) holds, then equilibria exist for all quality levels
0 ≤ sh ≤ ql of the high type’s free sample. If there are many informed con-
sumers with max{λˆ(qh, ql), 0} < λ < 1 then the quality of the high type’s free
sample in equilibrium is restricted to 0 < sh < qh − qlqh/[(1− λ)qh + λql)].
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Proof: See the argument above and note that f¯(qh, ql, sh, λ) from equation
(4) and g¯(qh, ql, sh, λ) from equation (8) are both decreasing and f(qh, ql, sh, λ)
from equation (5) and g(qh, ql, sh, λ) from equation (8) both increasing in sh
for all those sh < ql for which they are defined. In addition f¯(qh, ql, sh, λ) <
g¯(qh, ql, sh, λ) holds for all 0 ≤ sh ≤ 1/2[qh −
√
q2h − 4(1− λ)ql(qh − ql)] <
ql for which f¯(qh, ql, sh, λ) and f(qh, ql, sh, λ) are defined. The functions
g¯(qh, ql, sh, λ) and g(qh, ql, sh, λ) are defined for all 0 ≤ sh ≤ qh − qlqh/[(1 −
λ)qh + λql)] and qh − qlqh/[(1− λ)qh + λql) < ql holds for λ > qh(qh−2ql)(qh−ql)2 .
Thus, as long as there are some uninformed consumers (λ < 1) free samples
together with an adequately chosen price can serve as a signal for a high qual-
ity. In addition, if there are only a few informed consumers λ ≤ λˆ(qh, ql) the
identifying combination of (ph, sh) can even imply any quality level sh ≤ ql
of the high type’s free sample. There are, however, infinitely many combina-
tions of ph and sh which are perfect Bayesian equilibria. They are depicted
as hatched areas in Figure 1 for the two cases.
6
-
6
-
ph ph
sh shql
max{λˆ(qh, ql), 0} < λ < 1
ql
f(qh, ql, sh, λ)
g(qh, ql, sh, λ)
f¯(qh, ql, sh, λ)
g¯(qh, ql, sh, λ)
g¯(qh, ql, sh, λ)
f¯(qh, ql, sh, λ)
g(qh, ql, sh, λ)
f(qh, ql, sh, λ)
0 < λ ≤ λˆ(qh, ql)
Figure 1: The Set of All Possible Separating Equilibria
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4.2 The Intuitive Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Given the multitude of possible perfect Bayesian equilibria we want to focus
in the rest of the paper on those perfect Bayesian equilibria which satisfy
the intuitive criterion which roots back to Cho and Kreps (1987).6 They are
characterized in the next three Lemmas where we use the following definition:
λ¯(ql, qh) ≡ ql(q
2
h − qlqh − q2l )
(qh − ql)(qh + ql)2 . (9)
Lemma 1 If there are relatively many informed consumers, meaning 1 >
λ > ql/qh, then the perfect Bayesian equilibrium which satisfies the intuitive
criterion is unique. It implies that the two types of digital goods providers
choose the same prices as in the case where all consumers are informed,
meaning ph = qh/2 and pl = ql/2. Neither the high nor the low quality
provider does provide a free sample.
Proof: For a given quality of the free sample sh a high quality provider
maximizes his profit pi(ph, qh, sh) defined in equation (2), if he could set ph =
(qh − sh)/2. It is possible to show that f¯(qh, ql, sh, λ) < (qh − sh)/2 <
g¯(qh, ql, sh, λ) for all 0 ≤ sh ≤ min{ql, qh − qlqh/(qh − λ(qh − ql))} as long as
λ > ql/qh. Then the high quality provider realizes pi((qh − sh)/2, qh, sh) =
(qh − sh)/4. This profit is maximized if he chooses sh = 0 which is possible
without violating (4) and (8) because g¯(qh, ql, 0, λ) > qh/2 > f¯(qh, ql, 0, λ)
holds for all 0 ≤ sh ≤ 1/2[qh −
√
q2h − 4(1− λ)ql(qh − ql)] < ql.
The high quality provider can signal his superior quality without any free
sample and with the same price he would choose in the case where all the
consumers are informed if there are many informed consumers.7 In this case
the punishment by the informed consumers of a low quality provider, who
chooses the high price of a high quality provider, is very severe. A large
number of informed consumers identify him and reduce their demand for the
product. In addition the reduction in demand is the higher the smaller is
ql/qh or, equivalently, the larger is the difference between the low and the
high quality.
Lemma 2 If there is an intermediate number of informed consumers with
max{λ¯(ql, qh), 0} ≤ λ ≤ ql/qh where λ¯(·) is defined in (9), then the perfect
6The intuitive criterion is a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibria. In the present
context it selects all those equilibria where the sender of the signal may not realize a higher
profit by another signal that would also identify his type.
7See Bagwell and Riordan (1991) for an analogous result in the case of pure price
signalling.
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Bayesian equilibrium which satisfies the intuitive criterion is unique. It im-
plies that no provider type offers a free sample. The high quality provider
chooses (ph, sh) = (f¯(qh, ql, 0, λ), 0) with f¯(qh, ql, 0, λ) > qh/2 where f¯(·) is
defined in (4). The low quality provider chooses (pl, sl) = (ql/2, 0).
Proof: If max{λ¯(ql, qh)} ≤ λ ≤ ql/qh holds then the unrestricted profit
maximizing price (qh − sh)/2 violates condition (4) for 0 < sh < 1/2[qh −
(qh − ql)λ −
√
[qh(1− λ) + λql]2 − 4(qh − ql)(ql − λqh)]. For these levels of
sh the price ph = f¯(qh, ql, sh, λ) is profit maximizing, given the restriction
in (4) and (5). Since pi(max{f¯(qh, ql, sh, λ), (qh − sh)/2}, qh, sh) is decreasing
in sh for all 0 < sh < min{ql, qh − qlqh/(qh − λ(qh − ql))}, the high type’s
profit maximizing choice which still transmits a credible signal is sh = 0 and
ph = f¯(qh, ql, 0, λ).
For intermediate levels of informed consumers the high quality provider has
to increase the price of his product above the profit maximizing price in order
to credibly signal his superior quality. He abstains, however, from providing a
free sample. Given the lower number of informed consumers compared to the
situation in lemma 1, the punishment of a low quality provider who imitates
a high quality provider is only high enough, if the price is increased above
the level requested by the high quality monopolist with perfectly informed
consumers. Of course, this reduces the high quality provider’s profit, but not
as much as if he would also provide free samples.
Lemma 3 If there is a small number of informed consumers with 0 < λ <
λ¯(ql, qh)) where λ¯(·) is defined in (9), then the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
which satisfies the intuitive criterion is unique. It implies that the high quality
provider offers a free sample with the quality:
sh =
qhql − 4(1− λ)q2l + q2h(1− 4λ)− (qh − ql)
√
q2h − 4(1− λ)ql(qh − ql)
2[(2− 4λ)− (3− 4λ)ql]
≡ s¯(qh, ql, λ) ≥ 0.
The high quality provider chooses (ph, sh) = (f¯(qh, ql, s¯(qh, ql, λ), λ), s¯(qh, ql, λ))
with f¯(qh, ql, s¯(qh, ql, λ), λ) > (qh− s¯(qh, ql, λ))/2 and the low quality provider
(pl, ql) = (ql/2, 0).
Proof: If 0 < λ < λ¯(ql, qh) holds then the unrestricted profit maximizing
price (qh − sh)/2 still violates condition (4) for 0 < sh < 1/2[qh − (qh −
ql)λ −
√
[qh(1− λ) + λql]2 − 4(qh − ql)(ql − λqh)], given the level of sh. For
these levels of sh the price ph = f¯(qh, ql, sh, λ) is profit maximizing, given
the restriction in (4) and (5). The function pi(max{f¯(qh, ql, sh, λ), (qh −
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sh)/2}, qh, sh) has an interior maximum at sh = s¯(qh, ql, λ) < 1/2[qh −
(qh − ql)λ −
√
[qh(1− λ) + λql]2 − 4(qh − ql)(ql − λqh)]. Therefore, the high
type’s profit maximizing choice which still transmits a credible signal is
sh = s¯(qh, ql, λ) and ph = f¯(qh, ql, s¯(qh, ql, λ), λ).
For small numbers of informed consumers the high quality firm gains if it
does not only rely on higher prices in order to signal its superior quality.
This is due to the fact that the credible price increases if there are fewer
informed consumers and decreases if the high quality provider increases the
quality of its free sample. Here the loss of profits from the provision of the
free sample is more than compensated by the gain in profits from the possible
reduction of the credible price. However the firm never abstains from using
its price as a signalling device.8 The chosen price always exceeds the profit
maximizing price (qh − s¯(qh, ql, λ))/2.
From lemma 1, lemma 2 and lemma 3 it is now obvious, when the high
quality provider uses free samples as a signalling device.
Proposition 3 If we focus on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium which satis-
fies the intuitive criterion then the high quality provider uses free samples in
order to signal his superior quality only if the number of informed consumers
is low (0 < λ < λ¯(ql, qh)). Free samples are always an additional signalling
device which is only used combined with high prices and never used if the low
quality is relatively high ((
√
5− 1)qh/2 < ql < qh).
Proof: See lemma 1, lemma 2 and lemma 3 and note that λ¯(ql, qh) > 0 ⇔
0 < ql < (
√
5− 1)qh/2.
Proposition 3 as well as lemma 1, lemma 2 and lemma 3 are illustrated in
Figure 2. Note that for a given low number of informed consumers the high
quality provider does not have to distort his price or to provide a free sample
in order to credibly signal his superior quality as long as the quality differ-
ence measured by 1 − ql/qh between a high and a low quality provider is
pretty big. Although there are only a few informed consumers and although
the gain from misleading the uninformed consumers would be pretty high,
the informed consumer punish a low quality provider imitating a high type
severely enough that it is not necessary to distort prices or introduce free
samples in order to increase the punishment and reduce the gain from imi-
tation. If the difference in qualities becomes smaller this is not sufficient any
8Thus, the firm uses free samples in the same way as the conspicuous advertising
expenses in Milgrom and Roberts (1986), the low advertising rates in Zhao (2000) and
Bagwell and Overgaard (2005) or the distorted advertising in Orzach et al. (2002). These
additional signals are used in order to save on the signalling costs from a distorted price.
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6-
λ
ql
qh
1
1
ph = qh/2, sh = 0
ph > qh/2, sh = 0
ph > (qh − sh)/2, sh > 0
6
λ¯(ql, qh)
Figure 2: The Different Cases of Intuitive Equilibria
more and the high quality provider starts to distort prices, and provides for
an intermediate range of the quality difference even a free sample in order to
prevent imitation by a low quality provider.
Given that there are only very few experts (λ < λ¯(ql, qh)) simple differenti-
ation of s¯(qh, ql, λ) yields the comparative static results concerning the high
quality provider’s chosen quality level of the free sample in the intuitive per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium. They are summarized in corollary 1.
Corollary 1 The high quality provider chooses higher quality levels for the
free sample the smaller is the number of informed consumers (∂s¯(qh, ql, λ)/∂λ <
0) and the higher is the quality level qh of his digital product (∂s¯(qh, ql, λ)/∂qh >
0) in the intuitive perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The free sample’s quality has
a maximum in ql, meaning that it increases in the low type’s quality for low
levels of ql and decreases, if the low type’s quality is already rather high.
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It is pretty intuitive that the quality of the free sample can be reduced in
order to signal a high quality of the digital good if there are more informed
consumers. The punishment of an imitating low quality provider increases
in the number of informed consumers. Therefore it is not that necessary
anymore to increase this punishment via a high quality of the free sample.
An increase in the signalling activity if the quality of the high type increases
is also not very surprising. If the high quality qh increases for a given low
quality ql, then imitating the high quality provider becomes more profitable
for the low quality provider. In order to reduce this incentive it is necessary
to send more costly signals which translates into a higher quality sh of the free
sample. If the low quality ql increases for a given high quality qh, there are
two countervailing effects. On the one hand, imitation of the high quality
provider becomes less attractive for the low quality provider because the
profit gain from misleading the uninformed consumers is reduced. On the
other hand, the punishment by the informed consumers is also reduced which
means that imitation becomes less costly for the low quality provider. The
latter effect seems to dominate the former for relatively low levels of ql which
induces a higher signalling activity and, thus, a higher quality of the free
sample. The former dominates, if ql is already relatively high and reduces
the necessity to send costly signals which means that the quality of the high
quality provider’s free sample can be reduced.
4.3 Comparison of the Market Outcome in the Intu-
itive Equilibrium with and without Free Samples
From the analysis so far it is obvious that the profit of a high quality provider
increases in the intuitive equilibrium in all those cases where he provides free
samples compared to a situation where he is confined to pure price signalling,
because otherwise providing free samples would not be part of an intuitive
perfect equilibrium. The profit of a low quality provider is independent of the
chosen signalling device by a high quality provider. Therefore the following
proposition for the expected profit of a digital goods provider who does not
yet know whether his quality is high or low can be derived.
Proposition 4 If we focus on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium which satis-
fies the intuitive criterion, then the expected profit of a digital goods provider
is increased, if he is allowed to signal his quality also via a free sample and if
the number of consumers is small (0 < λ < λ¯(ql, qh)), compared to a situation
where he is confined to pure price signalling.
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Proof: See the argument above and Proposition 3.
The consumers are also only affected by a restriction to pure price signalling
if they face a high quality provider, since the behavior of the low quality
provider is the same no matter whether free samples are allowed or not,
and if the high quality provider would provide a free sample. The aggregate
expected consumer’s surplus is given by:
CS = γ
[∫ θ
h
0
θshdθ +
∫ 1
θ
h
θqh − phdθ
]
+ (1− γ)
∫ 1
θ
l
θql − ql
2
dθ (10)
where θh ≡ θ(ph, qh, sh) and θl ≡ θ(ql/2, ql, 0) holds and θ(·) is defined in (1).
From the analysis of the aggregate expected consumer’s surplus proposition
5 follows immediately.
Proposition 5 If we focus on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium which satis-
fies the intuitive criterion, then the aggregate expected consumer’s surplus is
increased, if the high quality provider is allowed to signal his quality also via
a free sample and if the number of consumers is small (0 < λ < λ¯(ql, qh)),
compared to a situation where he is confined to pure price signalling.
Proof: If 0 < λ < λ¯(ql, qh) holds then we know from lemma 3 that the
high quality provider chooses (ph, sh) = (f¯(qh, ql, s¯(qh, ql, λ), λ), s¯(qh, ql, λ)).
If he were not allowed to provide a free sample the intuitive perfect Bayesian
equilibrium would imply (ph, sh) = (f¯(qh, ql, 0, λ), 0). Given that ∂f¯(·)/∂sh <
0 holds for all 0 ≤ sh ≤ s¯(qh, ql, λ), the price with signalling via the free
sample is smaller than without the provision of a free sample. Thus, CS in
(10) is higher with sh = s¯(qh, ql, λ) than with sh = 0, as long as
θ(f¯(qh, ql, s¯(qh, ql, λ), λ), qh, s¯(qh, ql, λ)) < θ(f¯(qh, ql, 0, λ), qh, 0)
holds which is the case for all 0 < λ < λ¯(ql, qh).
The consumers gain because those who would not buy without a free sample
derive a surplus from the free sample and those, who buy, no matter whether
there is a free sample or not, profit from the lower price. In addition the high
quality provider provides the free sample only in those cases where the market
share of its digital product increases from the provision of the free sample.
Thus, more consumers enjoy the digital product’s high quality than without
the free sample. The market share increases, because the competition effect
of a free sample is more than compensated by the price reducing effect. The
price reduction is favorable for the high quality provider because he had to
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distort his price upwards, compared to a profit maximizing price, in order to
credibly signal his superior quality.
Since the aggregate expected social welfare is the sum of the expected profit
of the digital good’s provider and the aggregate expected consumer’s surplus,
we can conclude from proposition 4 and proposition 5:
Proposition 6 If we focus on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium which sat-
isfies the intuitive criterion, then the aggregate expected social welfare is in-
creased, if the high quality provider is allowed to signal his quality also via
a free sample and if the number of consumers is small (0 < λ < λ¯(ql, qh)),
compared to a situation where he is confined to pure price signalling.
Proof: See proposition 4, and proposition 5.
5 Conclusions
Our analysis shows that free samples can indeed serve as a signaling device
for a superior quality in the context of digital goods, if it is possible to
provide a free sample of a lower quality than the marketed digital good. If
we focus, however on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium which satisfies the
intuitive criterion, we figure out that free samples are never used as signals
in isolation. They are used as an additional signalling device together with
upwardly distorted prices. They reduce the upward distortion and are used
as soon as this effect more than compensates the negative effect of a costless
competing product on the market. Thus, if they are used, they increase the
aggregate expected profits of the digital goods provider, and the aggregate
expected consumer’s surplus, compared to a situation where the provider is
confined to pure price signalling. Social welfare is, of course, also higher in
the intuitive signalling equilibrium with free samples than in one where they
cannot be introduced.
Since social welfare increases, if free samples are used as a signalling device,
the provision of free samples should not be restricted in this case by any
antitrust or fair competition law. However, in order to give any kind of policy
recommendation one should extend the current model to situations with
competing suppliers. Preliminary results in a duopoly setting show that free
samples can only serve as a signal for a higher quality, if its quality exceeds the
lower quality level in the market. Thus, a high quality provider is uniquely
identified also for the uninformed consumers and low quality providers can
no longer compete with a high quality provider, but are preempted out of the
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market by the high quality provider’s free sample if it is used in equilibrium.
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